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Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: 
Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of 
Halliburton  
 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Two years ago, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and 
Trust Funds,1 a solid majority of the Supreme Court held that proof of the 
materiality of alleged misstatements or omissions was neither necessary nor 
appropriate to certify a class action on behalf of investors who bought or 
sold in the aftermath of the falsehoods.  At issue was the meaning—both 
substantively and procedurally—of the so-called “fraud on the market” 
presumption that had been established by the Court twenty-five years earlier 
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,2 whereby all such investors are presumed to have 
relied on the alleged fraud if they traded in an “efficient” market for those 
securities that was allegedly distorted by fraud.  The majority in Amgen said 
that the Rule 10b-5 class certification inquiry in the face of such a 
presumption is limited to issues not susceptible to class-wide proof.  
Materiality, being a single objective inquiry, is a class-wide question and 
hence not directly relevant to certification.  Three justices (Scalia, Thomas 
and Kennedy) disagreed, in two separate dissents, saying that proof of 
                                                            
*  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  My 
thanks to Hillary Sale, Andrew Tuch and participants at the ILEP symposium and a 
Georgetown faculty workshop for helpful comments. 
1  133 S.Ct. 1184 (2013).  The majority opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg. 
2 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  I have explored Basic extensively in prior work, particularly 
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 Wisc. L. 
Rev. 151; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities 
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 886-96 (1992); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135, 182-86 (2002).  
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materiality is a condition precedent to earning the presumption of reliance, 
without which certification necessarily fails because commonality unravels.   
 But this seemingly technical procedural issue exposed something far 
more fundamental.  The two dissents suggested that Basic may have been 
wrongly decided in 1988, and Justice Alito joined the majority but wrote a 
cryptic concurrence saying that the Basic presumption might have a shaky 
foundation that warrants future reconsideration.  The defense bar wasted no 
time in taking up the four justices’ invitation and sought review in a case 
that had already been up once to the Court, Erica P. John Fund v. 
Halliburton Co.,3 now asking that Basic be overruled.  Certiorari was 
granted in November 2013, generating substantial buzz as to what would 
happen next. 
 This surely was portentous, the possible death of a cause of action 
that has been the centerpiece of private securities litigation for the last forty 
years.4  Just in the last fifteen, private securities class actions (the vast 
majority of which are fraud-on-the-market) produced for investors more 
than $70 billion in settlements; in ten of those years, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ 
fees alone totaled more than $17 billion.5  On the defense side, these cases 
are just as big a revenue source for lawyers, if not bigger, and it is not hard 
to imagine some large law firm securities litigators who feared for their 
practices and privately prayed that these kinds of cases somehow survive.   
 In June 2014, the Court gave its answer in Halliburton II: Basic does 
survive, if largely as a matter of stare decisis.6  Whatever doubts were 
raised about the fraud-on-the-market theory were not enough to overcome 
                                                            
3 Shortly after Amgen, the Fifth Circuit held that Amgen and the Court’s earlier Halliburton 
decision together are properly read to foreclose any price distortion argument as part of the 
class certification decision.  Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 2013 WL 1809760 (5th 
Cir. 2013).  The earlier decision before the Court, discussed infra, was Erica P. John Fund 
v. Halliburton Co., 131 S.Ct. 2179 (2011), rejecting defendants’ argument that a showing 
of loss causation was an essential predicate to class certification. 
4  See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, The Fraud on the Market Tort, 66 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1755 (2013). 
5  See Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act, Bus. Law. (2014).  
6  -- S.Ct. --- (2014). 
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the strong presumption that Supreme Court precedent not be revised simply 
because the now-sitting justices would have decided the case differently.  
The Court did, however, hold that it was consistent with Basic to allow 
defendants to show the absence of any impact of the fraud on the market 
price of the issuer’s stock in order to defeat class certification, even though 
price impact is no different from materiality in terms of class-wide 
applicability.   
 This essay compares and contrasts Amgen and Halliburton II.  
Although Halliburton II is technically a unanimous decision in that all the 
justices favored reversing and remanding the lower court’s decision, the 
reality was a stark 6-3 split.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s 
opinion to uphold Basic.  Justices Thomas, Scalia and Alito vehemently 
disagreed with this ruling, concurring only because of the reversal and 
remand on the secondary issue of price distortion.  The surprise switch here 
was Justice Kennedy, who had joined Thomas’ dissent in Amgen but then 
voted with the Chief Justice to allow Basic to survive. 
 
II.  CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: SETTING POLICY FOR SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTIONS 
 
We begin with Amgen’s technical-seeming issue: whether plaintiffs 
had to establish the materiality of the alleged lies at the class certification 
stage.  As both sides conceded in their debate about who exactly was 
putting the cart before the horse,7 plaintiffs surely bear the burden of 
proving materiality in order to win their case.  The question was when, i.e., 
whether it occurs pre-discovery.8  The Amgen dissenters’ main argument 
                                                            
7  Compare 133 S.Ct. at 1191 with id. at 1211 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
8 Materiality determinations are aided by discovery to the extent that they deal with 
questions like the probability of an event’s occurrence at the time of the public statements, 
or how seriously the issue was taken inside the company at the time.  On the other hand, 
stock price reaction evidence—which as we will see, becomes a central issue much of the 
time—tends not to be.  Even that, however, takes time to develop.  The lower courts that 
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was that it is efficient to get rid of cases where the misstatements are likely 
to be immaterial earlier rather than later, and not unfair given the generous 
gift that Basic’s presumption affords the plaintiff class when materiality can 
be established. 
 But of course there is much more than just timing.  Leaving 
materiality to trial means, in all likelihood, that a jury makes that 
determination instead of the judge.  Materiality debates often turn on a mix 
of qualitative and quantitative evidence, the latter not likely to be 
understood particularly well by lay jurors. Defendants may reasonably 
suspect that they will fare better before a judge for this reason alone.  
Moreover, at trial there may be little to control for the trumping effect of 
hindsight bias—the inflated inference that because something bad happened 
later on, those on the inside must have suspected it all along and so bear 
responsibility for it.9  Given the large sums of money at stake plus the high 
costs of litigating just to get to trial, this fear supposedly contributes to 
settlement pressure, which happens almost inevitably if a class is certified 
and survives motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.  Thus plaintiffs’ 
strong desire to defer as many contestable issues as possible to trial, and for 
defendants to fight vigorously for pre-discovery resolution of the same.  
Amgen was just one of many settings where defendants had pushed for such 
an acceleration of a merits issue, and the Court’s rejection was, for the 
moment, a significant strategic win for plaintiffs in countering these moves. 
                                                                                                                                                      
had made materiality an issue in class certification disagreed as to who had the burden of 
proof on the defendant to rebut materiality.  See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Lit., 
544 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2008); In re DVI Inc. Securities Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 
2011)(defendant may rebut). 
9 See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773 (2004).  This is 
important because the approach to materiality with respect to speculative, future-oriented 
events is to ask the jury to balance the probability that the event would come to pass as of 
the time of the fraud against its likely magnitude—essentially an expected value 
calculation.  This test was endorsed in a separate holding in Basic.  On the somewhat 
surprising background to the Court’s resolution of this issue, see Donald C. Langevoort, 
Investor Protection and the Perils of Corporate Publicity: Basic Inc. v. Levinson, in THE 
ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 257 (Jonathan Macey, ed. 2008). 
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 Given the Supreme Court’s recent pro-defendant inclinations in 
securities class actions and class actions generally, including another sizable 
win for the class action defense-side just a few weeks after Amgen10, this 
settlement-bolstering win for plaintiffs was surprising to many.11  Indeed, 
reading the defense-side briefs in Amgen gave the clear impression they 
thought the Court would bless this tough stance to class certification 
because it was sound conservative policy to do so, and they expected a 
majority of the justices to do so simply by adhering to that instinct.12  But 
they failed, with the Chief Justice as the defector from the conservative side 
of the Court.   
So why did the Chief Justice side with the majority in Amgen, given 
his defendant-friendly votes in other close fraud-on-the-market decisions 
like Stoneridge13 and Janus Capital?14  To me, there is a point in the 
opinion that was crucial to assembling that unexpected majority, one that 
also strongly hinted at what would happen later on in Halliburton II.  As 
noted earlier, a strong thrust of the dissents was the “in terrorem” effect of 
class certification, impelling settlements even where merits issues like 
materiality and scienter are questionable—by now a familiar point in the 
case law—as good reason for an early assessment of materiality.  This, of 
                                                            
10  Comcast Corp. v. Behrends, 133 S.Ct. 24 (2013). 
11 I will leave to the civil procedure experts the task of reconciling Amgen with the 
noticeably contrary trend in class action litigation that is increasingly open to some degree 
of “merits” inquiry. See Linda Mullenix, Class Action Cacophony at the Supreme Court, 
Nat’l L.J. (April 15, 2013), at 28.  The majority and dissent in Halliburton II address this, 
with dramatically different conclusions. 
12  The dissenters worked hard to find in the Basic opinion itself an implicit pre-
certification materiality requirement, in order to make this move seem not just a simple 
exercise of judicial policy-making, the evidence for which did not impress the majority.  In 
fact, the parties could not cite any instances where a court insisted on a materiality showing 
as crucial to class certification until the mid-2000s.  If such a requirement was implicit in 
Basic, then, it lay undiscovered for a surprisingly long period of time.  Unmentioned in 
Amgen is the Sixth Circuit’s opinion on remand in Basic, which rejected the defendants’ 
request for summary judgment on materiality and sent the case to the district court for trial, 
prior to which the case settled.  See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 871 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1989).  
The court expressly affirmed the class certification even though materiality remained a live 
issue at trial.   
13  Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
14  Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
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course, invokes the debate that has raged well before Basic about purported 
class action abuses, and which led Congress to substantially reform private 
securities litigation in 1995.  In recent years, defendants have vigorously 
been making the argument that Congressional action in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act has implicitly “frozen” the outer limits of 
fraud-on-the-market class actions, precluding the judiciary from further 
expansion.  This connects to the conservative critique of 10b-5 litigation 
generally, which despises its origins in the form of a judicially implied right 
rather than Congressional action, and has long claimed that these litigation 
scope issues are warrant legislative reform than judicial invention.15  The 
Supreme Court’s Stoneridge decision articulates the “frozen in 1995” idea 
explicitly.16 
 But that is presumably a two-way street, indicating just as strongly 
that those doctrines that were firmly in place in 1995 are protected by that 
same logic.  Albeit without an explicit citation to Stoneridge, the Amgen 
majority made much of the fact that Congress rejected efforts to overturn 
Basic, while at the same time making so many important substantive and 
procedural changes (but not to the relevant aspects of class certification) to 
counter settlement pressure and excessive liability.17  Indeed, the structure 
of the PSLRA makes no sense except when read as a political compromise 
that preserves the foundation of the fraud-on-the market class action while 
making it harder for plaintiffs bring, plead and prove a successful claim 
through a variety of reforms.18 So it occupies the field, in a way that 
                                                            
15 See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative 
Securities Jurisprudence, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 933, 934-36 (2013). 
16  Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165-66 (2008)(“It is 
appropriate for us to assume that when [the PSLRA] was enacted, Congress accepted the 
§10(b) private cause of action as then defined but chose to extend it no further”).  
Stoneridge was addressing the extent of secondary liability in fraud-on-the-market suits. 
17  133 S.Ct. at 1200-01. 
18   The legislative history of the PLSRA has been thoroughly explored and makes clear 
that the statute was about fraud-on-the-market litigation.  See, e.g., John W. Avery, 
Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. Law. 355 (1996).  For a contrary view of the 
implications of the PSLRA, see Grundfest, supra.  One well-taken point made by 
petititoners and defense side amici in Halliburton II was that a minority in Congress 
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disappointed both the most insistent champions and the most strident critics 
of private securities litigation. When this happens, a natural conservative 
judicial move is to defer. 
 Given the well-established status of materiality as a fact question in 
numerous Supreme Court decisions both pre- and post-1995,19 the 
majority’s point that Congress could have adjusted the law relating to 
materiality and class certification determinations if it had wanted, but chose 
other potent reforms instead, has considerable strength.  This was the 
pointed message of a Seventh Circuit decision rejecting the role of 
materiality in class certification written by Frank Easterbrook, Schleicher v. 
Wendt,20 saying that “[w]e do not think it appropriate for the judiciary to 
make its own further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 23 to make likely 
success on the merits essential to class certification in securities-fraud 
suits.” It was a potent endorsement of deference to the PSLRA by a 
conservative scholar and judge quite expert in both the theory and practice 
of private securities litigation,21 in a case cited repeatedly by the Amgen 
majority.   
 Halliburton II, of course, involved this same separation of powers 
question on a much bigger scale—Basic’s very survival. In refusing to 
jettison Basic, the Chief Justice’s opinion in Halliburton II comes back to 
what Congress did and did not do in 1995, albeit within the more limited 
framework of stare decisis. The opinion stops short of saying that the 
PSLRA formally endorsed or acquiesced in Basic as a matter of law; 
instead, given the strong presumption of stare decisis, it is enough to say 
that ample opportunity was there for Congress to change the law if it 
wanted but that Congress chose more narrow compromise solutions instead.  
This might be the point that also brought Justice Kennedy over to the 
majority—after all, he was the author of the Stoneridge opinion, in which 
                                                                                                                                                      
(particularly the Senate) as well as the President (through a veto) can block legislation, so 
that a failure to act may not represent the preferred position of Congress as a whole. 
19  E.g., TSC Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, supra; 
Matrixx Inc. v. Siricusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011). 
20 618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010).   
21  See note [30] infra. 
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the “frozen in 1995” idea was first expressed.22  In any event, deference to 
the political process seems especially important to the outcomes in both 
cases. 
  
III.  MATERIALITY, PRICE DISTORTION AND CORRECTIVE DISCLOSURE 
 
 The disagreement in Amgen was about whether an early showing of 
materiality in an evidentiary hearing should be the price plaintiffs have to 
pay for Basic’s generous presumption of reliance and the class certification 
that readily follows.23 The majority said no, and a year later largely restated 
that conclusion in Halliburton II in ruling that plaintiffs did not have to 
show price distortion either in order to gain the presumption.  But then—
strangely, perhaps—the Court shifted ground in Halliburton II to say that 
defendants could raise a “no impact” defense in order to defeat class 
certification. Logically, those two aspects of Halliburton II seem 
inconsistent, the latter holding better seen as a pragmatic compromise to 
make the reaffirmance of Basic more palatable to securities class action 
critics and capture as large a majority of the Court as possible. 
 Here again, we start with Amgen.  Materiality is a deceptively 
simple idea, describing that which reasonable investors likely consider 
                                                            
22  Justice Thomas’ “concurrence” in Halliburton II questions whether stare decisis should 
play such a strong role when what is at issue is of the Court’s own making (an implied 
private right of action) rather than a matter of statutory interpretation.  As a result, he was 
unpersuaded that Congressional inaction in 1995 was relevant.  On the wholly inconsistent 
case law on legislative acquiescence, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative 
Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67 (1988).   
23 Basic permits a rebuttable presumption of reliance upon a showing that an investor 
traded during the relevant class period (i.e., after the misrepresentation but before 
correction), that the trading was on an “efficient” market, and that there was a material, 
public misstatement that distorted the market price.  This presumption of reliance, in turn, 
has been seen as essential to a finding of commonality under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to justify class certification. 
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important, i.e., relevant to the value of the issuer’s securities.24  When 
plaintiffs bring a securities class action, the pleadings inevitably claim that 
the truth withheld from investors was very important.  Apart from disputing 
what the truth was (a pure fact question) or whether it was fully appreciated 
by the defendant (a scienter inquiry) the most common response by the 
defense is a “truth on the market” defense: that the market already knew the 
truth, so that whatever the defendant said was unimportant even if it was 
false.25  This can be established qualitatively, by calling market participants 
as witnesses and demonstrating, through contemporaneous publicity or 
published research, that there was an adequate understanding of the true 
state of affairs to disregard management’s supposed deception.  The latter 
appears to be what defendants were anxious to do in Amgen.   
 As one can imagine, however, this kind of evidence is normally 
countered by plaintiffs’ own experts and publicity survey.  For some time 
now, the question of whether there is a noticeable stock price reaction to the 
alleged misstatement has been considered the best test to resolve contests 
between fraud-on-the-market and truth-on-the-market.26  Where a corporate 
lie is particularly dramatic and credible—false corporate “news”—we can 
expect a visible and prompt price reaction, usually on the upside.  Indeed, 
that intuition is the basis of the fraud-on-the-market presumption.  And that 
stock price distortion—often measurable via an event study—would tell us 
nearly everything necessary for plaintiffs to succeed or fail.  The reaction 
itself suggests that the information is material, and that distortion triggers 
Basic’s presumption of reliance.  The amount of the price distortion in turn 
might also be a good measure of damages.  Indeed, it was this promise of a 
rigorous, unified, empirical approach to materiality,27 reliance and causation 
via the event study tool that early on made the fraud-on-the-market theory 
                                                            
24 Matrixx Inc. v. Siricusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011)(rejecting a claim that statistically 
insignificant instances of harmful effects from a new drug were necessarily immaterial). 
25  See COX ET AL., supra, at 637-39. 
26  Jonathan Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance and 
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1017, 1021 (1991). 
27  See Roger Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the 
Total Mix, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 373 (1984), cited in Basic.   
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appealing even to fairly conservative judges and academics, a story I have 
explored in more depth elsewhere.28 
 But the simplicity was an illusion.29  As was the case in Amgen, the 
typical fraud-on-the-market case does not involve a single dramatic lie.  
Rather, it involves a narrative that begins when the issuer is doing 
reasonably well. Gradually, however, things start turning bad and 
eventually the issuer is forced to reveal its troubles (or the market simply 
figures it out), at which point the stock price is much lower than it was 
during the good times.  Plaintiffs will work to show that management 
knowingly or recklessly concealed those troubles.  But concealment is not 
necessarily unlawful (another one of Basic’s fundamental lessons30) and so 
there will have to be a showing that particular misstatements or actionable 
omissions, usually half-truths, distorted the stock price.31 For a variety of 
reasons, finding measurable distortion is often hard.  First, the alleged lies 
come out in dribs and drabs, with mainly incremental effect, and allegedly 
have the effect to preventing a decline in the stock price, not actually 
pumping it up.  Second, these alleged lies are often coupled with lots of 
other information about the issuer, some of which may have been accurate.  
There is simply no way of measuring distortion with precision in settings 
                                                            
28  See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 163-64. The seminal work here is Daniel 
Fischel, Use of Modern Financial Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively 
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1 (1982); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, 
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 611 (1985); Daniel Fischel, 
Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 
907 (1989).  Easterbrook and Fischel gather these ideas together in their classic book THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).  Credit for this law and economics 
vision is also due to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, who introduced this kind of analysis to 
the fraud-on-the-market case law, even before Easterbrook and Fischel, in In re LTV Sec. 
Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980).  Judge Higginbotham, later promoted to the Fifth 
Circuit, had a significant impact on the law since then as well. 
29  See Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 895 (2013). 
30  See Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of 
the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1990). 
31  Some call these “confirmatory” lies.  See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Revisiting 
Basic, 69 Bus. Law. 671 (2014). 
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like these.  Often there is no visible change in stock price at all, on which 
defendants seize for their truth-on-the-market defense.    
 Well before Basic, plaintiffs responded to this difficulty by turning 
attention not to the date(s) of the alleged lie(s) but rather the event of 
corrective disclosure—when the truth was later on brought home to the 
market.  When there was a big stock price drop after such disclosure, 
plaintiffs would argue by backwards induction that this was the drop was a 
good measure of the cumulative extent of the original distortion (and the 
right measure of damages as well).32  But once the inquiry extends to a 
potentially lengthy period of time between the original lie and the corrective 
disclosure, it is likely that there will be many intervening or supervening 
events that also make their way into the correction, making it hard—if not 
impossible—to disentangle all the effects with any econometric rigor.  The 
case law in this area exploded in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Dura 
Pharmaceuticals decision,33 with its insistence that plaintiffs put forth 
persuasive evidence of a price correction attributable to the fraud in order to 
establish “loss causation,” as is their statutory burden after the PSLRA. 
 Exploring how the courts have responded to all this is beyond the 
scope of my article;34 it is by all accounts a doctrinal and practical mess.35  
Courts vary considerably in how much they demand of plaintiffs, with 
many cases insistent that if plaintiffs cannot show with convincing evidence 
that there was either a price distortion at the time of the fraud or a deflation 
in price later on due to the revelation of the truth (not some separate causal 
                                                            
32  See, e.g., Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure 
Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 883 (1990). 
33  Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
34  See Fisch, supra; Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 178-89. 
35 See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 Iowa 
L. Rev. 811 (2009); James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want their CEO’s to Lie More 
After Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95 Geo. L.J. 653 (2007); Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Loss 
Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 63 Bus. Law. 163 (2007); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 Md. L. Rev. 348 (2007); 
Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. Corp. L.  829 
(2006); Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1 (2005). 
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event), they lose.  Of course, if this burden is imposed only at the trial on 
the merits, it may be largely illusory for the reasons discussed earlier—the 
case will be settled before then.  In response, urged on by defendants, more 
aggressive courts began finding ways to accelerate this inquiry, taking us to 
the present controversies.  As an effort to weed out these cases, class 
certification was appealing because it would permit an early evidentiary 
hearing, going well beyond the pleadings.  The Supreme Court tried to shut 
the door on using class certification to do this, first holding that loss 
causation is not an appropriate certification inquiry in the first iteration of 
Halliburton,36 then holding the same with respect to materiality in Amgen.37   
 Even though plaintiffs won considerable (but again, perhaps 
momentary) strategic victories in these two cases, this kind of pre-discovery 
skirmishing resembled the game of whack-a-mole in the way that these 
issues keep reappearing under different labels.38 For example, in a 
controversial series of opinions pioneered by then Judge Alito in the Third 
Circuit,39 where there is no stock price reaction to a misrepresentation or 
omission (or to the corrective disclosure when that is used for backwards 
inference), the information can be deemed immaterial as a matter of law and 
                                                            
36   Erica John Fund v. Halliburton Corp., 131 S.Ct. 2179 (2011).  See Fisch, Halliburton, 
supra.   
37  Technically, price distortion might be seen as different from both materiality and loss 
causation, though this did not persuade the Fifth Circuit in Halliburton II.  See note --- 
supra. 
38 Still uncertain, for example, is the extent of plaintiffs’ pleading burden with respect to 
price distortion and loss causation.  Even summary judgment is a possibility, 
notwithstanding the highly disputed factual nature of these issues.  See In re Williams Co. 
Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).  The court found a way to summary judgment 
via Daubert.  The district court, properly in the Tenth Circuit’s view, excluded the 
plaintiff’s expert evidence entirely for failing to make the necessary scientific showing for 
admissibility; thus there was no factual contest any more.  In sum, Williams concedes the 
likelihood of serious fraud closely connected with the reasons companies typically go 
bankrupt—hidden financial weakness—and yet dismissed the class action in its entirety. 
39   E.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997); for 
perhaps the most notorious example, not by Alito, see In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 
F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005), which uses immateriality as a matter of law even though there 
clearly was a later corrective reaction to the news once it became salient enough.  
Compare, e.g., Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2004).  See 
generally Stefan Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosure that 
Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 Pepperdine L. Rev. 927 (2007).   
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the case dismissed for that reason alone, quite apart from class 
certification.40   
 If read strictly, this is a troubling doctrine.41  The question of why 
there was no immediately visible stock price reaction is factually complex.  
Sometime reactions to information are delayed because of the subtlety of 
the disclosure or its “buried” nature, even in well-developed markets.  
Sometimes there is no reaction because, as noted earlier, the alleged fraud 
diffuses a price reaction that would have occurred in the absence of the 
fraud, and there is no obvious corresponding correction event because the 
information has already leaked into the market or because the correction has 
been bundled with other good news about the issuer.  While there will be 
some cases where the mix of qualitative and qualitative evidence of truth-
on-the-market is strong enough to justify pre-discovery dismissal,42 most 
are likely to involve substantial ambiguity. 
 So what this is really all about is the burden of palpable 
uncertainty,43 which takes us to Halliburton II.  Having determined that 
making plaintiffs show price impact at the class certification stage would be 
an inappropriate burden, the majority then allows defendants to raise the 
issue as a matter of a defense to certification.  Why?  The Court concedes 
that this is a class-wide issue, but (a) finds it the true predicate for the 
presumption of reliance for which the agreed-upon certification 
prerequisites (efficiency and publicity) are just indirect proxies; and (b) the 
issue tends to come up anyway in the course of assessing market 
efficiency.44  Defendants must be frustrated at the first of these claims, 
                                                            
40 That could be an explanation for Justice Alito’s choice to concur rather than dissent in 
Amgen: he may have been convinced that class certification is not the right place to deal 
with these issues because there are other pre-discovery opportunities for dismissal when 
price distortion isn’t obvious. 
41   See James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building 
on Amgen, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 1719 (2013); Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 189-91. 
42  E.g., Smith v. Circuit City Stores, 286 F. Supp.2d 707, 721 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
43   See John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption?, 60 Bus. Law. 533 (2005). 
44   After Halliburton I and Amgen, this was clearly a defense side strategy of choice.  See 
Lassaad Turki & Mark Allen, Amgen—What Has Not Been Said So Far!, 45 Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1046 (June 3, 2013); see also MUKESH BAJAJ & SUMON C. MAZUMDAR, 
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because it would seem to suggest that what is so fundamental to earning the 
presumption should be plaintiffs’ affirmative burden.  The second is curious 
because only some cases—and as we shall see shortly, perhaps many fewer 
in the future—seriously contest efficiency.   
The reality is that Halliburton II is choosing a middle ground policy: 
price distortion as an early stage, judge-made determination, but with the 
burden on the defendants.  In this sense, the Court is clearly back-tracking 
on both Amgen and Halliburton I.  How much this matters will depend on 
how lower courts structure and manage the inquiry.  If the approach to loss 
causation is any indication (and the proof as to loss causation tends to be the 
same as proof of distortion), this could turn out to be defendant-friendly—
the simple absence of statistically significant price movement at the key 
points in time as sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiffs to explain.  On 
the other hand, we have to remember, as Justice Ginsburg’s concurring 
opinion stresses, that the Court solidly rejected putting the burden on 
plaintiffs, suggesting that it would be inappropriate to draw an inference of 
non-impact too easily.  And—importantly—we also have to keep in mind 
that this is a binary question: simply was there impact, not how large was 
the distortion (which is inevitably the much harder inquiry).  We will dig 
more deeply into all this shortly. 
 
III.  ON WHAT?  EFFICIENCY, RELIANCE AND REBUTTABILITY 
 
 I have written at length elsewhere about the confusion Basic created 
in trying to explain the precise nature of the presumed reliance and how and 
why this relates to market efficiency,45 as have others.46  Neither Amgen nor 
                                                                                                                                                      
ASSESSING MARKET EFFICIENCY FOR RELIANCE ON THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET 
DOCTRINE AFTER WAL-MART AND AMGEN, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2302734 (July 29, 2013).  My sense is 
that this kind of argument has to be evaluated very skeptically, especially after Halliburton 
II.  See pp. --- infra. 
45   See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 166-78.  
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Halliburton II blows away the fog, though the latter is a welcome advance 
on the efficiency issue. 
Market efficiency is the idea that as a result of competitive research 
by market professionals and other mechanisms, “news” about an issuer (or 
indeed any other material public information) will be promptly incorporated 
into its stock price, so that traders thereafter cannot reasonably expect to 
profit from such news.47  It follows that most traders should not even try—
they can and should “free ride” on the professionals’ work by simply 
assuming that the consensus price is the best publicly-available estimate of 
the security’s value.  Index funds are commonly given as a good example of 
a rational, low-cost investment strategy in response to market efficiency.48 
 Basic’s muddle was this.  There are plenty of free-riders in the 
market who can reasonably say that they buy or sell without researching the 
company because they are relying on the market to do the work for them 
(the image of the market as the investors’ “unpaid agent,” referred to in 
both Basic and Halliburton II).  But there are just as many, if not more, who 
try to identify mispricing opportunities—stocks that seems undervalued or 
overvalued—and hence are not trusting the market to have gotten the 
valuation right.  Of course some of these do the research and actually rely 
on the misinformation, but not all.  Any presumption based simply on the 
                                                                                                                                                      
46   E.g., Cox, supra (though seeing in both the majority opinion in Amgen and Justice 
Scalia’s dissent a route toward a more coherent theory). 
47   Actually, it starts simply from the empirical observation that after a prompt period of 
adjustment to news, there are no significant cumulative abnormal returns—the price is as 
likely to go up as down—so that we can fairly say that the information has been impounded 
in the stock price.  The precise mechanisms of market efficiency remain contested.  See 
Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years 
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715 (2003).  This is the notion of “informational” 
efficiency.  “Fundamental” efficiency is an inference—that as a result of the forces that 
produce informational efficiency, it is more likely that the price reflects the stock’s intrinsic 
value.  Because there is no way of determining with precision what the intrinsic value is, 
fundamental efficiency is not directly testable. 
48  See Burton Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and its Critics, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 
59 (2003). 
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assumption of passive free-riding will be necessarily over-inclusive,49 
which raises disturbing questions about excessive liability as a result, 
because each and every class member is entitled to damages. 
 But this is not the only, or even the standard, justification for a 
presumption of reliance.  Midway through Basic—and again in both 
Amgen50 and Halliburton II—there is a subtle shift to the idea of reliance on 
“price integrity” for what is being presumed.  An investor assumes that the 
market price is undistorted by fraud, even if he or she thinks the stock may 
be under- or over-valued.  Here, active as well as passive investors would 
be entitled to the presumption, even in the absence of actual reliance, which 
is how Basic had generally been understood by commentators51 and applied 
by the courts.52  In Halliburton II, the Chief Justice says that “value 
investors” may think they can beat the market but are still assuming that the 
price will eventually adjust in the direction of their prediction because of 
the forces of market efficiency. 
 Yet the muddle doesn’t end here, because rational investors would 
never assume that prices have integrity.  Sadly, corporate fraud is not 
uncommon; one recent estimate suggests that the probability of any given 
public company engaging in fraud in a particular year is as much as 
14.5%.53  In an efficient market, the residual fraud risk is priced, not 
assumed away.54 
                                                            
49  See Grigori Erenburg et al., The Paradox of “Fraud-on-the-Market Theory”: Who 
Relies on the Efficiency of Market Prices?, 8 J. Empirical Leg. Studies 260 (2011). 
50   133 S.Ct. at 1192-93. 
51  See, e.g., Fischel, Crash, supra. 
52  See, e.g., Black v. Finantra, Inc., 418 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Worldcom Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
53  See ALEXANDER DYCK ET AL., HOW PERVASIVE IS CORPORATE FRAUD? (Feb. 2013), 
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2222608. 
54  But because diversified traders can gain as well as lose from fraud (if they are sellers at 
an inflated price), this market risk may not be all that great.  See sources cited in note --- 
infra. 
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 What Basic did, as much as anything, is create an entitlement to an 
undistorted stock price via, as I have described it, an act of juristic grace.55  
The most straight-forward way of articulating this—advocated by 
Easterbrook and Fischel, for example—would be to jettison reliance 
entirely and give investors a right to recover whenever they show price 
distortion that harmed them.56  This is a pure causation approach, and there 
is a fascinating back story to Basic here. Private correspondence between 
Justices Blackmun and Brennan while Basic was being was being drafted 
shows Blackmun stubbornly insisting that “transactional reliance” has to be 
preserved and a simple causation approach rejected.57  Their main point of 
disagreement has to do with whether a trader who was committed to selling 
without regard to the price (their hypothetical is someone who decides to 
divest immediately the shares of a company doing business in South Africa) 
is harmed by fraud-induced price distortion: Brennan’s causation approach 
says yes, Blackmun’s transactional approach says no.  Blackmun does edit 
the opinion in a couple of places to accommodate Brennan’s preferred 
locution of “price reliance,”58 though still unconvinced that there is much 
substance to the distinction. Brennan disagrees (and is not sure that 
Blackmun yet understands his point) but finally gives up, willingly 
                                                            
55  Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 161.  A pre-Basic recognition of this is Lipton v. 
Documation Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 748 (11th Cir. 1984)(“The theory . . . actually facilitates 
Congress’ intent . . . by enabling a purchaser to rely on an expectation that the securities 
markets are free from fraud.”)  Basic cites Lipton, with a page cite to this quote but not the 
quote itself.  485 U.S. at 246. 
56  See note --- supra; see also Fisch, Halliburton, supra. 
57  A copy of these letters is on file with the author.  The phrase “transactional reliance,” 
referring to Blackmun’s insistence that actual reliance is essential, seems to be Brennan’s.  
He distinguishes this from his preferred idea of “price reliance.” See Letter of January 22, 
1988, from Brennan to Blackmun, at 1 (“I fear that the Court’s opinion may be read as 
approving transactional reliance rather than price reliance”)(on file with the author).  Adam 
Pritchard uncovered this correspondence in the course of his historical research, and I am 
grateful to him for copies.  For previous use of this correspondence, see Langevoort, Basic 
at Twenty, supra, at 153 n.9, 157 n.25, 160 n.38; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra; see also 
STEPHEN CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 324-
25 (2005). 
58   See Letter of January 25 from Blackmun to Brennan, at 1.  I suspect that these edits and 
additions were the reason Basic is so hard to understand as to reliance—it tries to reconcile 
the price and transactional ideas (while clearly preserving the latter) without recognizing 
the underlying tension. 
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concurring because he realizes that once the presumption is invoked, the 
possibility that anyone will try to rebut it and challenge individualized 
reliance will be rare.59  Largely, he was right.  But Blackmun’s insistence 
on maintaining transactional reliance as the basis for the presumption leaves 
the decision incoherent and unsatisfying.60   
 Consider the important case of the index fund.61  Index funds are the 
poster children for passive low-cost investment, compelled to buy or sell 
stocks solely to maintain a weighted average of the chosen market index.  
They thus seem to fit perfectly within the free-riding vision.62  But these 
investors are entirely insensitive to information insofar as their entire 
methodology is just to mirror the index.  Even if told the truth about a 
particular issuer, they would still have to buy or sell to conform to the 
index. So why aren’t they just like the investor who committed to divest 
from South Africa? 
 There is no obvious answer, although a possible way out of the 
muddle would be to see the entitlement to undistorted stock prices as 
granted to the market generally.  If so, then there might be a number of 
different ways to rely that are within the zone of protection.  One is through 
                                                            
59   See Letter of January 27 from Brennan to Blackmun (“The difference between us is 
now clear.  In my view, the market relies on the defendant’s misstatement, and plaintiffs 
are defrauded because they are forced to act through the market.  Your view requires that in 
addition plaintiffs specifically depend on the integrity of the market, that is, that the market 
is fair.”)  Whether he was aware of it or not, Brennan was channeling Easterbrook and 
Fischel in these comments. 
60   My point here goes solely to the effort to describe the presumption in reliance terms.  
To me, Basic would make a great deal of sense in terms of conferring an entitlement to rely 
on the integrity of the market, which I think was what Brennan (and Easterbrook and 
Fischel) were reaching for.  For an elaboration of the economic justification for protecting 
reliance of this sort, see Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 771-80 (2006).  Brennan does use the term “price 
reliance”, but it is clear from the analysis in his letters that what he really meant was “price 
dependency,” since traders in an organized market have no choice but to accept the 
prevailing market price. 
61  See Cox, supra; see also RICHARD A. BOOTH, INDEX FUNDS AND SECURITIES FRAUD 
LITIGATION (Jan. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com=1996587.   
62  For cases including index investors within the presumption of reliance, see, e.g., In re 
Lehman Bros. Sec. Litig., 2013 WL 440622 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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passivity, assuming that the market is doing the best possible job of 
valuation in light of the entitlement. This might include index funds even if 
their actual decisions are information-less, though this is still not entirely 
clear.63  Another is through active investing, either through actual reliance 
on the misinformation in question or an investment strategy that seeks to 
beat the market but nonetheless utilizes the prevailing market price as an 
informational component of the investment decision.  In other words, the 
presumption is properly given to any active or passive purchaser or seller 
during the class period to whom the integrity of the stock price could be 
relevant, i.e., who would not necessarily have made the same investment 
decision had the truth been revealed.  That is essentially the approach used 
recently to justify a disqualification of a plaintiff from taking advantage of 
Basic’s presumption of reliance where the purchaser was a sophisticated 
active investor with a valuation model that incorporated a set of factors 
entirely separate from what the issuer was concealing from the market.64  
The court suggested that this was an extremely rare holding, in no way 
suggesting that active traders are normally disqualified from the 
presumption of reliance.  
 That is all background now, given Halliburton II’s endorsement of 
Basic’s presumption.  The Chief Justice gets caught up in much the same 
muddle as did Justice Blackmun twenty six years earlier—the inability to 
articulate exactly what the uninformed investor is reasonably relying upon 
in a way that does not simply revert to pure causation (and hence the system 
of “investor insurance” that everyone seems to want to avoid).  This is the 
focus of Justice Thomas’ dissenting concurrence, and there is some force to 
his critique.  
 The most enlightening conceptual contribution made by the majority 
opinion in Halliburton II is on market efficiency.  Certiorari was granted 
largely in response to the question Justice Alito posed in Amgen: do 
developments in our contemporary understanding of stock market 
                                                            
63 Index investing relies more heavily on portfolio diversification than any strong 
assumption of market efficiency to deal with issuer-specific risk.   
64  See Gamco Investors v. Vivendi S.A., 2013 WL 765122 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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efficiency—particularly skepticism about how efficient they really are—call 
into question Basic’s fundamental assumptions?  The Chief Justice says no, 
or at least not enough to overcome the stare decisis presumption.  He does 
so by stressing that the efficiency question is not meant to be particularly 
rigorous—“generalized” efficiency is sufficient, not some idealized vision 
of hyper-efficiency.  On this, he is clearly right.65   
I have explored the reasons for this in depth elsewhere,66 too, and so 
will be relatively brief. The contemporary understanding of financial 
markets makes clear that perfect efficiency is just an ideal; all markets fall 
short, some more than others.67  Informational efficiency (i.e., how quickly 
information is impounded in price so that subsequent price moves return to 
random) varies based on how widely followed the issuer is as well as the 
nature of the information.  Obscure information is impounded more slowly 
than salient information, even for blue-chip issuers.  And sentiment-based 
investors (noise traders) can sometimes move prices away from 
fundamental value for sustained periods of time, producing both 
underreaction and overreaction to both news and pseudo-news before the 
forces of efficiency cause a correction.68 
 None of this, however, undermines a presumption of reliance that is 
based either on the relative wisdom of passivity or an entitlement to assume 
stock price integrity.  Finance experts have hardly backed off the suggestion 
that index investing and other passive strategies are wise for most investors, 
even if the face of market imperfections.69  Index strategies remain popular, 
                                                            
65   Indeed, one might reasonably jettison the entire efficiency inquiry.  See Bebchuk & 
Ferrell, supra.  This the Court does not do, though perhaps it comes close. 
66  See sources cited in note – supra.  Ironically, my work was cited extensively by Justice 
Thomas for the opposite conclusion. 
67   On legal and regulatory manifestations of this contemporary understanding, see Henry 
T.C. Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an Uncertain Future, 4 
Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 179 (2012). 
68  For citations and elaboration, see Langevoort, Animal Spirits, supra.  See also Lynn 
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. 
Corp. L. 635 (2003); William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Hypothesis Help Us Do 
Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 Emory L.J. 843 (2005). 
69  See Malkiel, supra. 
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and profits from active trading strategies as elusive as ever.70  Stock price 
integrity is a worthy policy goal even in the face of (inevitably) imperfect 
efficiency. The key question in assessing the presumption of reliance is 
whether the market segment in which the securities are traded is such that it 
has sufficient efficiency properties to make us reasonably confident that 
misinformation is likely to distort the stock price.71  Most all well-organized 
markets meet this condition.  Efficiency, in other words, should just be a 
proxy for those markets in which passive investing is reasonable.   
 In recent years, unfortunately, defendants have had a fair amount 
success in persuading courts that the efficiency inquiry should be much 
more demanding than this.  Perhaps the best known case along these lines is 
In re PolyMedica Securities Litigation,72 a First Circuit decision that seems 
to insist on proof of immediate price reaction to all material information in 
order to justify a finding of sufficient efficiency.  Building on this this, 
particularly after Amgen, the defense-side was continuing the class 
certification battle as to price distortion by using the apparent absence of 
evidence of distortion as proof that for the issuer in question, its market 
must thus not be efficient—raising something that clearly is a certification 
issue.73  (The Chief Justice recognizes this strategy in Halliburton II when 
he says that price distortion is usually before the court in class certification 
anyway74).  
 Hopefully, Halliburton II will take much of the steam out of this 
effort by its emphasis on “general” market efficiency rather than hyper-
                                                            
70  See Gilson & Kraakman, supra. 
71  See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 161-62; Macey et al., supra, at 1021 (“The 
legal system should not withhold redress from an injured plaintiff simply because he owns 
the security of a corporation traded in a market considered by some court to be 
‘inefficient’”); Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes and 
Securities Litigation, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 443, 456 (2006)(efficiency inquiry with respect to the 
presumption of reliance should be a relative one, and not overly demanding); Fischel, supra 
(discussing efficiency implications of market volatility for Basic’s presumption).   
72  432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).   
73  See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 168-77; more recently, see Meyer v. Greene, 
710 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2013) and sources cited in note -- supra. 
74  There is some irony here because if the efficiency inquiry should be less demanding, as 
the opinion suggests, we should see less of an effort to prove non-efficiency. 
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efficiency. PolyMedica justified its more demanding standard by saying that 
Basic was ambiguous on the subject, explicitly disregarding a footnote in 
Basic that seemed to say that the inquiry should not be overly demanding.75  
Halliburton II, on the other hand, quotes and highlights that very same 
footnote.  There is a consensus in Halliburton II to reject any “binary” 
vision of market efficiency (i.e., that markets are either efficient or not, as 
opposed to a continuum of relative efficiency).  That is all well and good.  
But this strongly cautions against putting too much emphasis on the 
efficiency determination for class certification, because the judge must 
inevitably answer the question of sufficient efficiency as yes or no.  The 
factors that courts have used previously (the so-called Cammer factors) 
create an illusion that there is a scientific way of answering that question, 
when there really is not.76  The risk here is that the courts will defer too 
much to the econometricians. 
From here on out, all that should be necessary to establish efficiency 
is a showing that the company’s stock price generally responds to new 
information within a reasonable period of time—even if not immediately or 
fully.  That should not be all that hard.  In the course of this inquiry, it is 
important to avoid allowing defendants to cherry-pick instances of no price 
reaction. There can be many reasons for no-reaction or under-reaction in 
generally efficient markets, including that the market had figured out the 
essential truth on its own without waiting for corrective disclosure from the 
issuer, or that the significance of the information was hard to glean from the 
particular disclosure in question.  Both common sense and economic theory 
suggest that it will be the rare well-organized market that is not generally 
efficient. 
 
IV.  PRICE DISTORTION: DIGGING MORE DEEPLY 
 
                                                            
75   432 F.3d at 10-12.   
76  See Langevoort, Basic, supra at 169-73; see also Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra. 
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 The fraud-on-the-market theory was devised to create a form of 
corrective justice—compensating investors for real losses.77  It might also 
have beneficial effects in terms of deterring fraud, but that has always been 
secondary. Justice Blackmun’s stubborn insistence that the reliance 
requirement be preserved by making the presumption rebuttable 
underscores this, and neither Amgen nor Halliburton II lets go of that 
obsession. 
 Much contemporary legal scholarship has been critical of fraud-on-
the-market as a compensatory device, however.78  The arguments are by 
now familiar enough that we can summarize here, too. First, fraud produces 
windfall gains for many investors along with losses—indeed, putting aside 
insider trading in its various forms, the marketplace losses and gains are 
roughly equal.  Active traders are as likely to be winners as losers.  
Compensating for the losses while ignoring the gains, even for the same 
investor, leads to systematic overcompensation over time.  Second, because 
payments in judgment or settlement come from either a liability insurance 
policy or the company itself, investors themselves are funding these 
payouts, directly or indirectly—the so-called “circularity” argument.79  (We 
have known for some time that payouts by individual wrongdoers, i.e., 
senior company managers, are extremely uncommon80).  Together, these 
points argue that the fraud-on-the-market system is a very costly, and 
                                                            
77  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra. 
78 There is now a large literature on this debate.  The critique is thoroughly described in, 
e.g., William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 
160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69 (2011) and John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class 
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its  Implications, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534 (2006).  
For a particularly helpful exploration of the arguments and empirical evidence, pushing 
back on some of the critiques, see James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Mapping the 
American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence of the 
Enforcement of U.S Securities Laws, 6 Eur. Comp. & Fin. L. Rev. 164 (2009). 
79  See TOM BAKER & SEAN GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 134-36 
(2010). See also Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities 
Litigation, 2009 Wisc. L. Rev. 333; James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 
108 Mich. L. Rev. 323 (2009). 
80  See Michael Klausner et al., How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class 
Actions—An Update, 26 PLUS J., no. 5 (May 2013). 
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somewhat unnecessary, pocket-shifting mechanism that resembles an 
investor insurance policy. 
 While this argument has substantial traction, the main counterpoint 
is that that the injuries are real when investors trade at distorted prices, and 
simply can’t be assumed away by hoping that the victims will make up their 
losses elsewhere.81  Fraud causes injury to everyone who trades at a 
distorted price without regard to whether there was psychologically 
meaningful reliance—essentially the idea that Justice Brennan was pushing 
on Justice Blackmun.  One can then add on the deterrence argument: price 
distortion is a social harm with many serious externalities,82 and has to be 
policed.  The fraud-on-the-market class action is put forth by its proponents 
as practically necessary, if not conceptually clean, for achieving both of 
these objectives.83  I tend to agree, though not as enthusiastically as some 
others. 
 In this debate, two less familiar points are worth making about price 
distortion.  In theory, all plaintiffs should ever recover is the amount of the 
price distortion at the time of the fraud (the conventional out-of-pocket 
measure), so long as the truth was revealed before the plaintiff unwound its 
position.  But for a variety of reasons, litigants and courts long ago shifted 
focus to corrective disclosure as the key to damages,84 rather than price 
distortion per se.  Dura solidified this by stressing loss causation, making 
                                                            
81   See Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on “Circularity” and Other Issues, 2009 Wis. 
L. Rev. 455; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra; Fisch, Confronting Circularity, supra; 
Cox & Thomas, supra. 
82  See Urska Velikonja, The Costs of Securities Fraud, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1887 
(2013). 
83   For a critique on the value-added deterrence from private litigation, see Amanda Rose, 
The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 2173 (2010).  For evidence of a deterrence effect, see JARED JENNINGS ET AL., 
THE DETERRENCE EFFECT OF SEC ENFORCEMENT AND CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (June 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868578 (class actions cause more compliant 
behavior by peer firms of those targeted); see also Brian McTier & John Wald, The Causes 
and Consequences of Securities Class Actions, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 649 (2011).   
84 The key step here came when courts abandoned a strict out-of-pocket measure in favor 
of a modified one that used the corrective disclosure date as a baseline for computing 
damages, thereby making it closer to a rescission remedy.  E.g., Harris v. American Inv. 
Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976). 
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corrective disclosure even more central to the assessment of plaintiffs’ 
injuries.  As we have seen, this has made a mess of loss causation and 
damage measurements, and inspired the procedural moves designed to weed 
out the speculative cases (and most cases are at least somewhat speculative) 
early on.   
 Ironically, in the Blackmun-Brennan correspondence while Basic 
was being written, Blackmun says that while he wants to avoid any 
discussion of damages in the opinion, he agrees that the strict out-of-pocket 
measure (which Brennan sees as the necessary corollary to his “price 
reliance” approach85) makes more sense than a rescissionary one that would 
give the full merger value to the former Basic shareholders.  Had that 
impression made its way into the Basic opinion, the history of loss 
causation and the emphasis on corrective disclosure under Rule 10b-5 might 
have taken a completely different turn.  Only price distortion would have 
been important. 
 Halliburton II now makes proof of price impact (or its absence) as a 
key step in the litigation process, early on and before a judge.  But what is 
this inquiry, really?  My sense from the oral argument is that the justices 
seemed to think—and counsel did little to discourage it—that event studies 
are a clean and simple way to answer the narrow and specific distortion 
question.  Sadly, that is far from so.  We have already seen the challenge 
when the effect of the alleged lie is to lull investors into thinking that 
nothing has changed about the company’s fundamentals, when change is 
indeed occurring.  We will see how courts approach this and other 
conceptual challenges, hopefully remembering that the burden is clearly on 
the defendants and that the task is simply to estimate whether there was 
                                                            
85  Letter of January 25, 1988, from Blackmun to Brennan, at 2 (“I had not thought the 
opinion supported an argument for receiving the merger price . . . an argument we both 
agree is largely implausible, but because it has not been briefed or discussed, we should not 
presume to reject it out of hand here”)(on file with author).  See also Letter of January 27, 
1988, from Brennan to Blackmun (“if [there is no rebuttal and] the measure of damages is 
ultimately resolved as the difference between the price actually received and the price that 
would have been received had the market been fair, my view and your view will lead to 
identical results, although by somewhat different routes”).   
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price impact or not, not to quantify the extent of the distortion (which is 
usually a much harder task).  Event studies may help, but there is no reason 
in the class certification inquiry to limit evidence to those, especially in 
“confirmatory lie” cases.  Courts should be open to all probative evidence 
on that question—qualitative as well as quantitative—aided by a good dose 
of common sense.86  If the facts at issue appear to be material, one can fairly 
presume that their misrepresentation or omission would necessarily distort 
the market price unless the market somehow already knew the truth.87 The 
latter is entirely possible under the right circumstances, but defendants’ 
burden to show. 
 No doubt defendants will push against this, trying to fit into the 
evidentiary hearing on impact nearly the entirety of their merits defenses.  
After all, price distortion is the difference between the price that prevailed 
and the price had there been no fraud (i.e., had the truth been told).  So is it 
open to defendants at class certification to argue that the company told what 
it believed to be the truth, so that therefore there was no price distortion?88  
That, of course, is the heart of the merits, and something no econometrician 
could possibly address.  There is no indication that the Court contemplates 
this, but given the centrality of price distortion, defendants will presumably 
seek as capacious a scope to it as possible. 
                                                            
86   For a description of the modern quantitative toolkit, which is by no means limited to 
event studies, see Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra.  See also Esther Bruegger & Frederick 
Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. Corp. L. 
11 (2009). 
87   This would resemble the separate presumption created to address reliance in Affiliated 
Ute Citizens v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128 (1972).   
88  Imagine, for example, that plaintiffs allege two confirmatory lies that prevented the 
market from reflecting the truth about the issuer’s prospects.  Defendants’ merits defense is 
that at the time those disclosures were made, there was no corporate scienter (i.e., the 
disclosures, even if inaccurate, were made in good faith).  A stock price drop occurs later 
on, but defendants claim that this was a result of a prompt revelation of the truth when 
company officials learned it.  Perhaps that is what Justice Ginsburg was getting at in her 
concurring opinion, which raised the possibility of the need for limited discovery in sorting 
through all the relevant price impact issues at class certification. 
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Indeed, this may well expose an underappreciated counterfactual 
difficulty about the nature of securities fraud in the first place.89  Securities 
regulation imposes only a limited duty on issuers and their managers to 
reveal the truth—much can lawfully be concealed if the issuer prefers, 
especially with respect to forward-looking information.  That is a central 
point made in Basic.  However, if the issuer chooses to comment on a 
matter, it must do so truthfully.  Hence there is a large category of cases 
where it is ambiguous what is meant by comparing the price that prevailed 
at the time of the fraud with the price that would have prevailed in the 
absence of the fraud.  Is it the world where there simply was no lie or half-
truth (but in which the issuer could have kept quiet about the truth) or are 
we assuming a (legally non-existent) duty to reveal everything?  This is a 
very tricky inquiry, but note that investors deserve little or no recovery for 
reliance on price integrity when the former is the right way of posing the 
question.   
 Imagine, for example, a company that falsely states that things are 
going smoothly for its flagship product when they really are not.  If the 
market price was $20 per share at the time, such an announcement would 
have little effect on the price to the extent that the information just confirms 
prior market expectations.  Had the truth been told, assume that the price 
would have dropped to $15. Should post-fraud purchasers receive $5 per 
share?  Only if we are confident that the right counterfactual is revelation of 
the truth.  If the more plausible counterfactual is instead that the issuer 
chose (lawfully) to stay silent, those purchasers would presumably have 
paid $20 for the stock even absent the fraud, and thus suffered no real 
economic harm.  In other words, the assumption that there are causal losses 
to purchasers or sellers whenever there are material lies or omissions is not 
necessarily true.  Whenever the issuer had no legal duty to reveal the truth, 
harm follows only when the effect of the lie or half-truth was to prevent 
                                                            
89 See Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and the 
Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J. Corp. L. 183 (2009). 
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discovery of the truth.  As tricky and important as this inquiry is,90 it is 
ignored entirely by contemporary doctrine, which simply assumes the truth-
telling counterfactual by focusing solely on the market effects associated 
with discovering the truth later on.  In sum, we cannot say as confidently as 
we do that fraud necessarily means investor injury in a setting that presumes 
reliance on “price integrity.”91 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 In his dissent in the Amgen case, which very much foreshadowed his 
dissenting concurrence in Halliburton II, Justice Thomas traced the history 
of the fraud-on-the-market prior to Basic by reference to two “signposts,”92 
one of which was the seminal Ninth Circuit case of Blackie v. Barrack in 
1975.93  That was a fruitless effort in terms of reading Blackie to say that 
materiality was crucial to class certification—it holds no such thing—but 
also ironic.  Blackie justified the fraud-on-the-market presumption entirely 
in pragmatic terms.  While it expresses an intuition about organized markets 
and the importance of price integrity, the main idea is simple: without class 
certification there will be no practicable mechanism to address 
demonstrable harm from securities fraud.   Candidly admitting that its 
approach risked over-inclusion in the plaintiff class, the court reminded its 
readers that the securities statutes were to “be liberally construed to 
effectuate its remedial purposes, and that that purpose may be served only 
by allowing an over-inclusive recovery to a defrauded class if the 
                                                            
90   It is of course hard to think through whether the company would have been able to stay 
silent on a matter in the face of shareholder, analyst and financial press scrutiny.  Typically, 
the half-truth is designed to throw these groups off their guard. 
91  This, of course, is in addition to any doubts that we may have based on the possibility of 
sentiment-driven overreactions to disclosures.  See Langevoort, Animal Spirits, supra; 
Cornell & Rutten, supra, at 463-68.   
92  133 S.Ct. at 1213-14.   
93  524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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unavailability of the class device renders the alternative a grossly under-
inclusive recovery.”94 
 Basic starts out saying much the same thing, stressing that 
presumptions exist mainly to do justice, but then wanders into the efficient 
markets discussion as if it offers a better way of understanding reliance in 
modern financial markets.  It doesn’t, generating the uncertainty about class 
certification that eventually led to Amgen and Halliburton I and II.  
Blackie’s argument was always the better one, and the fraud-on-the-market 
theory would have been on more solid ground (if no less controversial) had 
that reasoning prevailed. 
 Today the Supreme Court is no long enamored with the “liberally 
construed” rhetoric,95 which naturally invites those dissatisfied with how 
things have turned out to question the premises on which the fraud-on-the-
market presumption rests.  Still, as a result of Halliburton II, Basic lives on.  
To the Chief Justice and his majority, fundamental changes to the 
availability of class action relief for alleged securities fraud should be 
legislative (and hence political), not judicially-wrought.  By situating the 
issue as one of stare decisis—and thus triggering something of a light-touch 
rational basis review of Basic—the Court’s opinion will hardly satisfy those 
who, like the dissenters, who find Basic’s reasoning contrived and its failure 
to take on the hard policy issues underlying securities class actions 
frustrating.  
 Along with others,96 my work was cited repeatedly in Justice 
Thomas’ concurring dissent in Halliburton II, and I concede that I still find 
the reliance narrative in both Basic and Halliburton II puzzling and not 
particularly persuasive, for many of the reasons Thomas points out.  Yet I 
think Thomas’ ultimate conclusion is wrong, and that keeping Basic in 
place was the right thing to do, both legally and conceptually.  My view is 
                                                            
94  Id. at 906 n.22. 
95  See A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 33, 50-51 (Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, ed., 2013). 
96   Particularly work by Jim Cox and Lynn Stout. 
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ultimately much closer to Justice Brennan’s, who worked hard behind the 
scenes many years ago to articulate an approach to fraud-on-the-market that 
had little or nothing to do with reliance (for more conservative readers, 
substitute Easterbrook and Fischel). We would have been better off had he 
succeeded. As Brennan, Easterbrook and Fischel saw, however, that 
expansive approach to who can recover needs to be balanced with caution 
about the total size of the recovery, to avoid the bias toward over-
compensation that characterizes the current doctrinal framework.  All of this 
has long suggested—to me and many others—that Congress should revisit 
the entire remedial approach in the fraud-on-the-market setting, enabling 
private litigation but making it more clearly a deterrence-based 
mechanism.97  Whether Congress is inclined toward a sensible, balanced 
approach to the serious problem of securities fraud is in doubt, however.   
In the meantime, we will have to wait and see how lower courts 
react to the many possible implications of Amgen and Halliburton II.  While 
it need not (and probably should not) be, the price distortion inquiry may 
well turn to be another thicket where polarized views about the desirability 
of fraud-on-the-market continue to affect outcomes.  The game of whack-a-
mole plays on. 
                                                            
97 See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market Securities Fraud, 38 
Ariz. L. Rev. 639 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully:A Duty 
Based Approach to Reliance and Third Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 2125 (2010); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities 
Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 501 (1996).  There are many possible approaches, from 
damage caps or disgorgement measures to what is effectively a qui tam procedure.  As 
suggested earlier, much judicial misunderstanding could have been avoided had Basic 
endorsed a strict price distortion approach to damages, as both Justices Blackmun and 
Brennan seemed to want.  But unwinding the post-Dura loss causation to get to that simple 
approach would, at this point, be very hard. 
